The most likely estimator of the temperature parameter is ~~0.001416~~ __-0.11560__
and the standard error of this estimator is 0.047, in other words
**WRONG** ~~we
cannot distinguish any particular impact~~
_it is inverse-dependent on temperature, if temperature decreases by 1 degree, the probability of O-ring malfunction increases by 0.1156,_ and we must take our
estimates with caution.
# Estimation of the probability of O-ring malfunction
The expected temperature on the take-off day is 31°F. Let's try to
temperature has **VERY** ~~no~~ significant impact on the probability of failure of the
O-rings. It will be ~~about 0.2~~ **in average over 0.8 to as high as more than 1.0 (certain)**,~~as in the tests
where we had a failure of at least one joint~~ **so we are expecting a failure of at least 4 joints**. Let's ~~get back to the initial dataset to~~ estimate the probability of failure:
This probability is thus about $p=`r round(estim$fit, digits = 5)`\pm`r round(estim$se.fit, digits = 5)`$. Knowing that there is
a primary and a secondary O-ring on each of the three parts of the
launcher, the probability of failure of both joints of a launcher
is $p^2 \approx `r round((estim$fit+estim$se.fit)^2, digits = 2)`\pm`r round(2*estim$se.fit*estim$fit, digits = 2)`$. The probability of failure of any one of the
launchers is $1-(1-p^2)^3 \approx `r (1-(1-round((estim$fit+estim$se.fit)^2, digits = 0))^3)*100`\%$. ~~That would really be
bad luck.... Everything is under control, so the takeoff can happen
tomorrow as planned~~.**ABORT! ABORT! ABORT THE MISSION!**
*Unfortunately, none of the above analysis was carried out properly and* the next day, the Challenger shuttle exploded and took away
with her the seven crew members. The public was shocked and in
the subsequent investigation, the reliability of the
O-rings was questioned. Beyond the internal communication problems
of NASA, which have a lot to do with this fiasco, the previous analysis